Greensboro Councilwoman Dianne Bellamy-Small is catching some heat for allegedly saying some things that could be construed as an effort to intimidate a young Greensboro police officer who had pulled her over on suspicions of speeding.

In an effort to keep this in the proper perspective, I felt it important to note that the young officer's decision not to ticket Bellamy-Small fits into the model that a team of economists developed after studying the political economy determinants of traffic fines.  From the study's abstract:

Speeding tickets are not only determined by the speed of the offender, but by incentives faced by police officers and their vote maximizing principals. Our model predicts that police officers issue higher fines when drivers have a higher opportunity cost of contesting a ticket, and when drivers do not reside in the community where they are stopped. The model also predicts that local officers are more likely to issue a ticket when legal limits prevent the local government from increasing revenues though other instruments such as property taxes. We find support for the hypotheses. The farther the residence of a driver from the municipality where the ticket could be contested, the higher is the likelihood of a speeding fine, and the larger the amount of the fine. The probability of a fine issued by a local officer is higher in towns when constraints on increasing property taxes are binding, the property tax base is lower, and the town is more dependent on revenues from tourism.

I hope people read the study before making further comment on the appropriateness of the Councilwoman's alleged behavior.  Thanks!

(Thanks to Professor Tyler Cowen for alerting me to this timely study.)